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PREARRAIGNMENT INTERROGATION AND THE McNABB-
MALLORY MIASMA: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
UNDER rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, "an officer
making an arrest" must bring the arrested person before a United States
commissioner or other committing official "without unnecessary delay."' Com-
plying with rule 5(b), the commissioner will then advise the accused of his
privilege against self-incrimination, his right to retain counsel, and his right
to a preliminary hearing 2 for determining whether "there is probable cause
1. .4ppearance before the Commissioner. An officer making an arrest under a war-
rant issued upon a complaint or' any person making an arrest without a warrant
shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest avail-
able commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons
charged with offenses against the laws of the United States. When a person ar-
rested without a warrant is brought before a commissioner or other officer, a
complaint shall be filed forthwith.
FED. R. CRIm. P. 5(a).
Rule 5(a) applies exclusively to arrests made upon a warrant issued on a complaint,
see FED. R. CRim. P. 3, 4, or without a warrant. See generally Orfield, Warrant of
Arrest and Summons Upon Complaint in Federal Criminal Procedure, 27 U. CINc. L
REv. 1 (1958); Orfield, The Complaint in Federal Criminal Procedure, 46 Ky. L.J. 7
(1957). When arrest is made upon a warrant issued on an indictment or information,
the accused is to be brought "promptly" before a federal court or commissioner for pur-
poses of bail. FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(c) (1). See generally Orfield, Warrant or Sumnwns
Upon Indictent or Information in Federal Criminal Procedure, 23 Mo. L. REv. 308
(1958).
Officers empowered to commit persons charged with federal offenses include state
judges, justices of the peace and other state magistrates. 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (1952). Ap-
parently, arresting officers complying with rule 5(a) may bring the accused -to either
a state or federal committing official so long as such official is nearby. See Gold, Con-
fessions in the United States Courts, 21 PA. B.A.Q. 272 (1950).
2. Statement by the Commissioner. The commissioner shall inform the defendant of
the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel and of his right 'to have
a preliminary examination. He shall also inform the defendant that he is not re-
quired to make a statement and that any statement made by him may be used
against him. The commissioner shall allow the defendant reasonable time and
opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the defendant to bail as provided
in these rules.
FRD. R. Gtim. P. 5(b). See also United States v. Bradford, 122 F. Supp. 915, 919 (S.D.
N.Y. 1954); U.S. JUDICIAL CONFEREXCE, COM-M. oN1 U.S. COa1NTISSIONFRS, MANUAL FOR
UNITED STATES COMM SSlONERS 8-9 (rev. ed. 1948).
The accused has no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing. United States ex
rel. Hughes v. Gault, 271. U.S. 142, 149 (1926); Clarke v. Huff, 119 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir.
1941); Garrison v. Johnston, 104 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1939). And failure to grant him
one does not invalidate his prosecution. United States ex rel. Bogish v. Tees, 211 F.2d
69, 72 (3d Cir. 1954) (indictment) ; Davis v. United States, 210 F2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.
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to believe" that he committed a crime.3 At the preliminary hearing, both the
accused and the Government may present evidence.4 If the commissioner finds
"probable cause," the accused must be either admitted to bail or committed
to the custody of a United States marshal for detentionP Absent "probable
1954) (indictment) ; United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1953) (infor-
mation).
The commissioner may grant a continuance to enable either side to prepare its case.
James v. Lawrence, 176 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; United States v. Gray, 87 F. Supp.
436 (D.D.C. 1949). But see Lloyd v. United States, 259 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (con-
curring opinion). During a continuance, the accused may be indicted by a grand jury,
and no preliminary hearing need be held. United States v. Gray, supra. But see concur-
ring opinion in Lloyd v. United States, supra.
State judges and magistrates acting as committing officers under rule 5(a) are not
bound to hold the preliminary hearing which the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide for. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 54(a) (2). They may proceed according to the law
of their respective jurisdictions. 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (1952). Since arresting officers are not
bound to bring the accused to a United States commissioner rather than a state official,
see note 1 supra, the purpose of rule 5(b) may thus be thwarted.
Rule 5(b) provides only for retained and not assigned counsel. Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules, FED. R. Ciut. P. 44. Usually, the accused has no constitutional
right to counsel at the preliminary hearing. Burall v. Johnston, 53 F. Supp. 126, 129
(N.D. Cal. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945) :
In. re Bates, 2 Fed. Cas. 1015 (No. 1099a) (D.S.C. 1858); United States v. Bollman,
24 Fed. Cas. 1189, 1191 n.2 (No. 14622) (C.C.D.D.C. 1807). He may have such a right
if the absence of an attorney unduly prejudices him at trial. Wood v. United States, 128
F.2d 265, 271. (D.C. Cir. 1942). Subsequent representation by counsel will seemingly cure
any prejudice incurred at the preliminary hearing. See Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S.
82 (1946); Alexander v. United States, 136 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1943); McJordan v.
Huff, 133 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Application of Lyda, 154 F. Supp. 237, 238 (N.D.
Cal. 1957).
3. Preliminary Examination. The defendant shall not be called upon to plead. If the
defendant waives preliminary examination, the commissioner shall forthwith hold
him to answer in the district court. If the defendant does not waive examination,
the commissioner shall hear the evidence within a reasonable time. The defendant
may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own
behalf. If from the evidence it appears to the commissioner that there is probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has
committed it, the commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in the district
court; otherwise the commissioner shall discharge him. The commissioner shall
admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules. After concluding the pro-
ceeding the commissioner shall transmit forthwith to the clerk of the district
court all papers in the proceeding and any bail taken by him.
FED. R. CRIa. P. 5 (c).
4. Ibid. As to whether strict rules of evidence apply at the preliminary examination,
compare In re Van Campen, 28 Fed. Cas. 954, 955 (No. 16835) (S.D.N.Y. 1868), with
In re Dana, 68 Fed. 886, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1895). State courts are in similar conflict. Coin-
pare In re Plummer, 79 Cal. App. 2d 651, 655, 180 P.2d 771, 775 (1947), with Davis
v. State, 65 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1953), and People v. Medley, 339 Mich. 486, 492, 64 N.W.
2d 708, 712 (1954).
5. See FED. R. Clum. P. 5(c), supra note 3; FED. R. Cant. P. 46(a) (1) (right to
bail); 18 U.S.C. §§ 4042, 4086 (1952) (place of commitment); U.S. JurncliAL CoER-
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cause," the accused must be discharged.6 Should the preliminary hearing be
waived, the accused will be immediately jailed or bailed.7
Police officials claim that effective interrogation is possible only during the
interval between arrest and arraignment by a committing officer.8 In order
to take full advantage of this opportunity to interrogate, law enforcement
agents have frequently ignored the command of rule 5(a) and have delayed
arraignment for substantial periods of time.9 To deter infractions of this sort,
the Supreme Court held in McNabb v. United States that incriminating state-
ments obtained from an accused illegally detained between arrest and arraign-
ment are inadmissible in United States courts.10
FNCE, C OIM. ON U.S. CO1,n1ISSIONERS, MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES COMIlSSIONERS
12-18 (rev. ed. 1948) (administration of bail and commitment by the commissioner).
"Probable cause" may be established by evidence insufficient to convict. United States v.
Slaugenhoupt, 102 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Pa. 1952) (existence of indictment sufficient);
United States v. Bloomgart, 24 Fed. Cas. 1180 (No. 14612) (S.D.N.Y. 186) (no proof
of corpus delicti); United States v. Cobb, 25 Fed. Cas. 481 (No. 14820) (N.D.N.Y.
1857) (prima facie evidence of guilt). A commissioner's finding of "probable cause" is
reviewable. United States v. Zerbst, 111 F. Supp. 807 (E.D.S.C. 1953).
6. FEn. R. CRIM. P. 5 (c), supra note 3.
7. Ibid. For the effect of a waiver on defects in the arrest or complaint, see Gior-
denello v. United States, 241 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957); United States v. Walker, 197
F.2d 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 877 (1952).
8. See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary on H.R. 3690, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 12, at 6-7 (1944) [hereinafter cited as
1944 Hearings]; Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee to Study Decisions of thle
Supreme Court of the United States of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 12, at 40, 42 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 House Hearings].
Arraignment before the commissioner also ends the danger of "third degree" practices.
A MEMORANDUM ON THE DETENTION OF ARRESTED PERSONS ACCOMPANYING A STATE-
1MENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
ON H.R. 3690, at 15-17 (1944) [hereinafter cited as ABA STATEMENT]; 4 NAT'L COMM'N
ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT 169, 210-11 (1931) [hereinafter cited
as WICKERSHAM REPORT]; HOPKINS, OuR LAWLESS POLICE 131 (1931).
The term "arraignment" is used in this Comment to designate the initial appearance
of the accused before a committing officer. See Orfield, Proceedings Before the Com-
missioner in Federal Criminal Procedure, 19 U. Pitr. L. REv. 489, 504 & nn.45-48, 538
& n.332 (1958). The same word has been traditionally used to describe the appearance
of the accused before the court in order to plead in answer to formal charges. E.g., FED.
R. CRIM. P. 10.
9. 'See, e.g., Rettig v. United States, 239 F.2d 916, 920-21. (D.C. Cir. 1956) (28
hours) ; United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951) (29 hours) ; Haines v.
United States, 188 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1951) (23 hours) ; cf. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, ILLINOIS DmSION, SECr DETENTION By THE CHICAGO POLICE (1959).
10. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The McNabb rule has been interpreted also to exclude in-
criminating evidence other than statements obtained from the accused during an unlaw-
ful delay. United States v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494, 498 (2d Cir. 1956) (testimony con-
cerning phone calls to accused detained in his own apartment), criticized in Note, 66
YALE L.J. 270; Watson v. United States, 249 F.2d 106, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (clothing).
But the rule does not exclude exculpatory statements. Starr v. United States, No. 13865,
D.C. Cir., Oct. 17, 1958, at 3-4. Nor will a confession lawfully elicited but apparently
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The McNabb rule represents an exercise of the Court's supervisory power
over the administration of criminal justice in federal courts and a fulfillment
of its duty to formulate civilized standards of procedure and evidence. 1 The
purpose of federal prompt-arraignment legislation,12 in the view of the Court,
is to check resort to coercion and brutality and to avoid the evil implications
of secret interrogation.'" From this premise, the Court reasoned that the ad-
mission of material evidence obtained in contravention of a law requiring
prompt arraignment would stultify the policy underlying the law.' 4 By thus
compelling compliance with restrictions upon prearraignment detention, the
Court sought to forestall delays frequently leading to the elicitation of evi-
dence in a manner violating due process of law. 15 The exclusion of evidence
derived from a previous illegally obtained confession be excluded. United States v. Bayer,
331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947). Whether nonconfessional evidence derived through the
elicitation of confessional or nonconfessional evidence in violation of rule 5(a) is inad-
missible has yet to be decided. See Comment, 53 YALE L.J. 758, 772 (11944) ; Note, 47
COLUm. L. Rlv. 1214, 1218 (1947). Language in the Bayer case indicated that if the
subsequent evidence is nonconfessional, it might be excluded by analogy to wire-tapping
cases such as Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). United States v. Bayer,
supra at 541.
11. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943); cf. Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-42 (:1939) ; Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934) ; Funk
v. United States, 290 U.S. 371. (1933). See generally 1 WIGmom, EvmExcz §§ 6-6b (3d
ed. 1940).
12. McNabb was decided before the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were for-
mulated. The Court relied upon 28 Stat. 416 (1894), which required arresting officers
to bring the accused before a judicial officer for a hearing. Although the statute made
no mention of promptness, courts had read into it a prohibition against "unnecessary
delay." Bullock v. United States, 122 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; United States ex rel.
Humphrey v. Janus, 30 F.2d 530 (E.D. Idaho 1929), rev'd of other grounds, 38 F.2d
431 (9th Cir. 1930). The Court also mentioned 48 Stat. 1008 (1934) (F.B.I. must take
arrested persons "immediately" before a committing officer) ; 20 Stat. 342 (1879) (per-
sons arrested while operating an illicit distillery must be brought "forthwith" to a judi-
cial officer) ; and a host of state statutes. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342
n.7 (1943). For a discussion of the legislative history of the federal statutes mentioned
in McNabb, see Inbau, The Confession Dilemina; in the United States Supreme Court,
43 ILL. L. Rav. 442, 455-59 (1949). For a compilation of state prompt-arraignment laws,
see Hearings on. Confessions and Police Detention Before the Subconzmmittee on Constiltu-
tional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 735-48
(1958).
13. McNabb v. United States, supra note 12, at 344.
14. Id. at 345.
15. See Mallory v. United .States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957) ("wilful disobedience of
law" evoked exclusion in McNabb because "unwarranted detention led to tempting utili-
zation of intensive interrogation easily gliding into the evils of 'the third degree' ");
United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1951) (purpose of McNabb was to abolish
unlawful detention "thought to give opportunity for improper pressure by police before
the accused had the benefit of the statement by the commissioner"); Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953) (McNabb sought "to abolish the opportunities for coercion
which prolonged detention without a hearing is said to enhance") ; Upshaw v. United
States, 335 U.S. 410, 412 (1948) (McNabb designed to check resort by officers to "secret
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obtained in derogation of the procedural proscription against "unnecessary
delay" is not, however, constitutionally required.
6
The short life of the McNabb rule has not been an altogether happy one.
The Supreme Court's development of the rule has been hesitant and impre-
cise, the lower courts', confusing and inconsistent.' 7 To begin with, the Mc-
Nabb decision itself indicates both that incriminating statements are inadmis-
sible solely because they were obtained during an illegal delay, and, contra-
dictorily, that the presence of potentially coercive activity during detention
is a prerequisite to exclusion.18 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions intro-
interrogation of persons accused of crime") ; Note, 66 YAL L.J. 270, 277 n.29 (1956)
(collecting authorities). But see Hogan & Snee, The Mciabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise,
Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1, 32 (1958) (McNabb designed to avoid debasement
of judicial process by excluding evidence obtained in contravention of law).
The Court noted in McNabb that it need not reach any constitutional issue. 318 U.S.
at 340. Petitioners claimed that their admissions were not made voluntarily and therefore
should have been excluded from evidence. Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 2, 6, McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). A new trial was requested on the ground that
government agents had committed manifest violations of the fifth amendment, but no
specific clause in the amendment was relied upon. Id. at 6. Petitioners were apparently
understood to claim a violation of due process, see 318 U.S. at 339-40, rather than an
abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination. See Brain v. United States, 168
U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
The Court has never used the fifth amendment's due process clause to hold extra-
judicial incriminating statements inadmissible. It has preferred in federal cases to rely
upon nonconstitutional rules of evidence. Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S.
1 (1924); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896); Hardy v. United States, 186
U.S. 224 (1902). But see Bram v. United States, supra at 542 (confession excluded as
violating privilege against self-incrimination). Nevertheless, the nonconstitutional test
used in federal cases is the same as that applied by the Court in state cases in which
a violation of fourteenth amendment due process is claimed. Inbau, supra note 12, at 448;
Note, 66 YALE L.J. 270, 278 n.32 (1956); Note, 5 STAN. L. REv. 459, 460 n.9 (1953).
The fourteenth amendment prohibits the admission of involuntarily given incriminating
statements. E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) ; Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S.
556 (1954). To be "voluntary" an incriminating statement must be elicited by methods
which do not cast doubt on its reliability and which do not offend standards of funda-
mental fairness. See note 122 infra and accompanying text. For purposes of this Comment,
the term "coercion" refers to methods rendering a statement "involuntary."
16. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 n.4 (1958); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 476 (1953); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1951). Not constrained
under the fourteenth amendment to adhere to the McNabb doctrine, state courts have
been uniformly reluctant to adopt a similar rule. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248,
320 P.2d 446, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 922 (1958); People v. Searcy, 153 Cal. App. 2d
799, 314 P.2d 1002 (1957); State v. Zukauskas, 132 Conn. -450, 45 A.,2d 289 (1945).
17. As to lower-court confusion, compare United States v. Hoffman, 137 F.2d 416,
421 (2d Cir. 1943), With United States v. Corn, 54 F. Supp. 307, 309 (E.D. Wis. 1944),
and United States v. Klee, 50 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Wash. 1.943).
18. Compare United States v. Grote, 140 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1944), and Gros v.
United States, 136 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1943) (indicating coercive activity necessary),
with United States v. Keegan, 141 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1944), and Runnels v. United
States, 138 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1943) (holding time delay sufficient). The vagueness of
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duced the notion that unlawful delay must induce particular evidence to war-
rant its exclusion.' 9 In its most recent application of McNabb, Mallory v. Uni-
ted States, the Court left no doubt that unlawful delay alone evokes exclusion.2
What constitutes unnecessary delay was left unsettled, however,2 1 and the dis-
agreement among lower-court judges remains as great as ever.22
The muddled evolution of the McNabb doctrine has troubled Congress as
well as the judiciary. Legislative concern has centered less on the conflicting
decisions of federal judges than on a fear that restricted police interrogation
will impair the investigation of crime,2 3 for law-enforcement officials have
argued that, by limiting the interrogation of arrested persons, the McNabb
rule renders many serious crimes unsolvable and thereby threatens public
safety.24 Congress first reacted with a proposal-the Hobbs Bill-which was
designed to overturn McNabb 25 and which passed the House three times but
repeatedly died in committee in the Senate.2 6 The Mallory case revived con-
gressional activity 2 7 and, of the several anti-Mallory measures suggested, one
the Court's decision is noted in McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the
Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEXAs L. Rsr. 239, 270-71 (1946) ; Comment, 42 Micia.
L. REv. 679, 680 (1944); 56 H.Av. L. Rav. 1008, 1009 (1943).
That unlawful delay alone was ground for exclusion should have been clear from the
companion case of Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943). But lower courts
concentrated their attention on the more fully developed yet more ambiguous decision
in McNabb, and neglected the possibilities for clarification offered by Anderson. See
Note, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 1214, 1217 & nn.17 & 18 (1947).
19. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70 (1944); Upshaw v. United States,
335 U.S. 410, 413 (1948). This rationale was followed by lower courts in Alderman v.
United States, 165 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Boone v. United States, 164 F.2d 102
('D.C. Cir. 1947) ; Sykes v. United States, 143 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
20. 354 U.S. 449 (1957). The Court had previously taken this position in Upshaw
v. United States, supra note 19. See Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in
Federal Criminal Procedure, 19 U. PIrr. L. Rxv. 489, 546-47 & nn.397 & 398 (1958).
21. See notes 39-66 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 67-111 infra and accompanying text.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 29,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1947); S. REP. No. 1478, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1958);
H.R. REP. No. 1815, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958).
24. See 1944 Hearings 1-10; 1958 House Hearings 32-71; Hearings on the Admis-
sion of Evidence (Ml allory Rule) Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-42 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Senate Hear-
ings].
25. H.R. 3690, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). This bill provided "that no failure to
observe the requirement of law as to the time within which a person under arrest must
be brought before a magistrate, commissioner, or court shall render inadmissible any
evidence that is otherwise admissible."
26. House passage is recorded at 90 CONG. REc. 9376 (1944); 91 CoNc. REc. 2508
(1945) ; 93 CONG. REc. 1392 (1947). The bill was never reported out of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary. For contemporaneous reaction to the Hobbs Bill see Dession,
The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (pt. 1), 55 YALE L.J. 694, 710-13 (1946);
32 CORNEmL L.Q. 594 (1947); 38 J. Cums. L. & C. 136 (1947).
27. Press reaction to the Mallory opinion was mixed. See U.S. News & World Re-
port, July 26, 1957, pp. 38-40; id., Nov. 29, 1957, pp. 34-35; Washington Post & Times
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so far has been successful in the House.28 This bill was amended and passed by
the Senate, -9 but, upon emerging from conference altered still again, was killed
by a point of order on the Senate floor.30
The present status of the McNabb doctrine is unclear. Its vagueness invites
unwitting violations and uneven application. Moreover, the balance which it
strikes between defendants' rights and effective law enforcement seems a hap-
hazard one. This Comment will analyze the McNabb doctrine in the light of
Mallory and subsequent lower-court decisions; question the wisdom of the
Court's evidentiary rule and of proposed remedial legislation; and suggest that
the difficulties arising from the doctrine's application are best remedied not
by repealing it but by altering the procedural rules which underlie it.
THE MALLORY CASE AND THE MEANING OF McNABB
The Mallory Case
Arrested for rape at 2:30 on a weekday afternoon, Andrew Mallory was
brought to police headquarters along with his two grown nephews, who were
also suspects. 31 In the presence of other police personnel, four officers inter-
rogated Mallory some forty minutes. He persistently denied committing the
crime. All three suspects then agreed to a lie-detector test. At 8:00 p.m., Mal-
lory was left alone with a polygraph operator and, following an hour and a
half of questioning, he admitted guilt, then repeated his confession to other
officers. A deputy coroner examined him at this time and found no indications
of physical or mental coercion. Subsequent to his oral confessions but before
he signed a stenographic copy, the police told Mallory that he need not say
or sign anything and that whatever he said could be used against him.32 He
was brought before a United States commissioner the following morning. The
defendant was nineteen years old and incompetent to stand trial for a year
following his indictment. When the case was finally tried, his signed confes-
sion was admitted in evidence over the objection of counsel. The jury con-
victed him and sentenced him to death.
On appeal, Mallory claimed that his confession should have been excluded
from evidence because it was procured in violation of rule 5(a). 3 Rejecting
this contention, the court held it reasonable and within the rule for the police
to delay arraignment until fairly certain that the guilty party had been appre-
hended. The court said that, since the accused was one of three suspects, the
Herald, June 27, 1957, p. 1, col. 2; id., June 30, 1957, p. E5, col. 3; id., July 5, 1957, p.
A15, col. 1; New Republic, April 7, 1958, p. 3.
28. See notes 177-78 infra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 179-86 ibfra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 187-92 infra and accompanying text.
31. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449-50 (1957). Except as otherwise indicated,
the statement of facts appearing in text was drawn from id. at 450-51, 455.
32. 1958 House Hearings 37; 1958 Senate Hearings 41. This procedure was not
discussed by either the court of appeals or the Supreme Court.
33. Mallory v. United States, 236 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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police could postpone arraigning him for a reasonable time until able to justi-
fy charges.3 4 Furthermore, the court observed, the accused did not show that
the interval complained of induced his confession. 5 Judge Bazelon dissented
and noted an injustice in permitting arrest and interrogation to occur for the
purpose of establishing "probable cause"-which should have existed before
the arrest was made.3 6 The dissent challenged the court's intimation that a
delay which did not induce a confession would not result in exclusion. Ac-
cording to Judge Bazelon, a delay for purposes of interrogation is illegal ;37
and, if delay was unavoidable or reasonable as the majority suggested, the
police could introduce a confession obtained through interrogation only if, be-
fore questioning began, they had advised the accused of his right to remain
silent.38
34. Ibid. In United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951), the Supreme Court
implied in dictum that arraignment may be lawfully delayed for the purpose of question-
ing an arrested person in order to ascertain his guilt. See id. at 44. But this dictum was
diametrically opposed to the Court's reasoning in Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S.
410 (1948), decided but three years earlier. The Carignan opinion was written by Justice
Reed, who had dissented in McNabb, 318 U.S. at 349 ("I am opposed to broadening the
possibilities of defendants escaping punishment by these more rigorous technical require-
ments in the administration of justice."); had concurred in United States v. Mitchell,
322 U.S. 65, 71 ('1944) ("[T]he McNabb rule is that where there has been illegal de-
tention ... joined with other circumstances .. . contrary to proper conduct of federal
prosecutions, the confession will not be admitted .... However, . . . I do not agree that
the rule works a wise change in federal procedure."); and dissented in Upshaw, supra
at 429 ("This [McNabbl rule is that purposeful, unlawful detention illegally to extract
evidence and the successful extraction of confessions under psychological pressure, other
than mere detention for limited periods, makes confessions so obtained inadmissible.").
35. 236 F.2d at 703; see note 1.9 supra.
36. 236 F.2d 706-07.
37. Id. at 707. Compare Upsbaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 413 (1948).
38. 236 F.2d at 705. In developing the McNabb rule, the Supreme Court had paid
little attention to the accused's lack of counsel, or to the failure of the police to inform
him prior to questioning of his right to remain silent. See McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 336 (1943); McNabb v. United States, 123 F.2d 848, 851-52 (6th Cir. 1941).
No mention of a warning was made in United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944),
or in Upshaw v. United States, supqra note 37. But see Brief for Petitioner, p. 4, United
States v. Mitchell, supra (officers testified that they told the accused "that he did not
have to say anything") ; Record, p. 83, Upshaw v. United States, supra note 37 (warn-
ing that accused need not make a statement and that any statement made could be used
against him written above signed confession). Yet, in Carignan v. United States, 342
U.S. 36 (1951), the Court noted that the purpose of McNabb was to abolish the oppor-
tunity for police' pressure before the accused had the benefit of appearing before a com-
mitting officer and being advised of his rights. Id. at 44-45. See note 2 supra.
Lower-court judges, in applying the McNabb rule prior to Mallory, not only took
notice of police cautioning but in addition considered such factors as the accessibility of
committing officers and the susceptibility of a particular defendant to psychological pres-
sure. See Pixley v. United States, 220 F.2d 912, 913 (10th Cir. 1955) (caution) ; Haines
v. United States, 188 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 1951) (caution) ; Duncan v. United States,
197 F.2d 935, 937 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 885 (1952) (accessibility) ; Garner
v. United States, 174 F.2d 499, 501-02 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 945 (1949)
(accessibility) ; Watson v. United States, 234 F.2d 42, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (susceptibil-
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Reaching the result advocated by Judge Bazelon, the Supreme Court re-
versed Mallory's conviction8D The Court left no doubt that "unnecessary de-
lay" requires the exclusion of evidence even when the delay does not cause
or induce the accused to speak. But the Court failed to define how long delay
may last before detention becomes "unnecessary." Certain sections of the
opinion indicate that the permissible interval between arrest and arraignment
is extremely short: the accused must be taken before a judicial officer "as
quickly as possible" ;40 the Rules of Criminal Procedure contemplate "little
more leeway than the interval between arrest and the ordinary administrative
steps required to bring a suspect before the nearest available magistrate." 41
Still, the Court expressly permitted the police time to "book" an arrested
person, and observed that sometimes "circumstances may justify a brief de-
lay."'42 Nonetheless, it ruled that in no event may arraignment be postponed
"to carry out a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed,"
to eliciting incriminating statements,43 and that delay may not be of a nature
to "give opportunity for the extraction of a confession. '44
These generalities leave many of the McNabb interstices unfilled.45 The
only "circumstance" which the Court mentions as justifying delay is the
"quick verification" of an accused's story by third parties. 46 Although a list
of other such "circumstances" could not be considered as exhaustive, the men-
tion of one without an explanation of why it justifies delay is perplexing. If
the Court had described several, a useful definition might be inferrable. The
Court was scarcely more explicit about the duration of "brief delay": it must
not be "of a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a confession. '47
If, in using this phrase, the Court contemplated the use of physical brutality,
permissible delay would of necessity be momentary, for a confession can be
extracted by torture in a matter of minutes. But the Court itself acknowledged
that rule 5(a) "does not call for mechanical or automatic obedience."'48 Pos-
sibly, the Court meant to keep opportunities for physical coercion to a mini-
mum. More probably, Mallory's concern over extracted confessions related
back to the sentence in the decision forbidding a "process of inquiry"-that
is, presumably, a period of interrogation inviting psychological pressure. Read
ity) ; Rettig v. United States, 239 F.2d 916, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion)
(susceptibility). See also Note, 43 VA. L. Rav. 915, 920-30 ('1957).
39. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
40. Id. at 454.
41. Id. at 453.
42. Id. at 454-55. Booldng includes "nakling the necessary papers," fingerprinting
and identification. See 1958 Senate Hearings 407; NEw YoRx CiTY PdLIcE DEP'T,
RULES AND PROCEDURES ch. 9 (1956) (procedure at statiofi house after arrest).
43. 354 U.S. at 454.
44. Id. at 455.
45. But see 60 W. VA. L. Rrv. 195, 196 (1958) ("Mr. Justice Frankfurter has writ-
ten a clear and lucid manual on the law of arrest and detention for federal officers.").




THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in this manner, Mallory defines unlawful delay to effectuate the lcNabb
objective of preventing the coercion likely to result from rigorous question-
ing.49 The Court could have defined the duration of unlawful delay more pre-
cisely by spelling out the indicia of a "process of inquiry." As matters stand,
lower courts applying Mallory are left to determine whether the duration of
inquiry alone is decisive or whether other factors such as the number and
rapidity of questions and the suggestibility of the accused must also be con-
sidered.
After laying down general principles, the Mallory Court asserted that the
"circumstances of this case preclude a holding that arraignment was without
'unnecessary delay.' ,0 The Court then mentioned that the accused was ques-
tioned "even though the police had ample evidence from other sources than
the petitioner for regarding the petitioner as the chief suspect."'o Reference to
this fact is confusing. It suggests that the questioning would have been less
objectionable had the police lacked evidence of guilt. But the opinion else-
where prohibits "a process of inquiry that lends itself... to eliciting damag-
ing statements to support the arrest,"52 and disapproves arrests made with-
out "probable cause" in order to extract information to justify charges.5 3
The Court also noted that Mallory was of extremely limited intelligence
and unadvised of his right to counsel. 54 He was not told prior to interroga-
tion that he need not answer any questions and that anything he said could
be used against him.55 The Court's allusion to these facts may well relate
back to its prohibition of any delay which would permit a period of inter-
rogation likely to result in psychological coercion. Such a relation back is
supportable, since the probability of coercion is lessened when the accused is
mentally alert and properly forewarned of his rights.56 His intelligence bears
not only upon his general ability to resist coercion 5 7 but also upon the suf-
ficiency of a police caution, for a warning is of no relevance unless the accused
can understand it.58 And if he is of limited intelligence, a warning, to be
meaningful, would have to be carefully explained to him. 9
49. See note 15 supra.
50. 354 U.S. at 455.
51. Ibid.
52. Id. at 454.
53. Id. at 456.
54. Id. at 455; see note 38 supra.
55. Ibid.; see notes 32, 38 suapra.
56. See Green v. United States, 236 F.2d 708, 715, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (dissenting
opinion), rev'd on other grounds, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) ; Note, 43 VA. L. REv. 915, 928
(1957). Compare Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957), 6 DE PAUL L. REv. 293, 295.
57. Compare Fikes v. Alabama, supra note 56; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185
(1953); 18 U. PIrr. L. Ray. 823 (1957).
58. In United States v. Valente, 155 F. Supp. 577 (D. Mass. 1957), the court ac-
corded no weight to a warning given prior to interrogation to an accused who spoke
broken English and was questioned through an interpreter.
59. Cf. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633
(D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Bayless v. Johnston, 48 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
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On the other hand, the Court's discussion of Mallory's individual charac-
teristics may only have been intended to demonstrate the importance of apply-
ing a strict but uniform standard in his case. Rule 5(a), in speaking of "un-
necessary delay," appears to refer exclusively to the general feasibility of
prompt arraignment and not at all to the peculiarities of each particular
defendant. 60 By particularizing on Mallory's susceptibility to questioning, the
Court implied the contrary-but without specifying the weight, if any, to be
given the special characteristics of the accused.
The principal defect of the Mallory opinion was its failure to delineate
clearly the relevance of the accessibility of committing magistrates. Among
the "circumstances" which the Court enumerated as precluding a holding that
the arraignment was "without unnecessary delay," was the fact that arraign-
ment could have easily been accomplished. 6' The arrest, the Court noted, was
made "within the vicinity of numerous committing magistrates," and arraign-
ment could have taken place in the very building in which the prisoner was
being held.02 Furthermore, in its more general discussion, the Court indicated
that the pertinent delay is the time consumed in bringing the suspect before
the "nearest available magistrate. '0 3 Thus, the opinion strongly suggests that
delay is legitimate when caused by the inaccessibility of a committing officer.r4
If this is so, Mallory authorizes delays much longer than might be needed to
"extract a confession" or to conduct a "process of inquiry" toward that end.
Yet the need to protect arrested persons against potentially coercive activity
represents the Court's principal justification of its exclusionary rule. 65 In-
consistent considerations have therefore been advanced without any indication
as to which shall govern when they conflict. A possible reconciliation could be
effected if those delays necessitated by the unavailability of a magistrate were
allowed, but interim conduct constituting a process of inquiry or the extrac-
tion of a confession were proscribed. 66 As written, however, Mallory offers
no such reconciliation. The Court's silence has left to lower tribunals the for-
mulation of a solution which may or may not meet with the Court's approval.
Lover-Court Decisions Since Mallory
The burden of interpreting the Mallory decision has fallen principally upon
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which hears the great
60. See note 1 supra.
61. 354 U.S. at 455.
62. Ibid.
63. Id. at 453. Prior to Mallory, lower courts frequently held McVabb inapplicable
when a committing officer was unavailable. See note 38 supra.
64. See Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Proce-
dure, 19 U. Plrr. L. Rav. 489, 556 (1958) ; Note, 43 VA. L. REy. 915, 924 (1957). But
see 26 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 102, 105 (1957).
65. See note 15 supra.
66. See Judge Bazelon's dissent in Trilling v. United States, Nos. 13069, 13165, and
13212, D.C. Cir., April 17, 1958, at 22-23.
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majority of federal criminal appeals.61 In determining the legality or illegality
of delay under rule 5 (a), this court has concentrated its attention upon police
purpose, justifying circumstances, the accessibility of committing officers, and
the maximum time permitted the police regardless of the individual situation.
In nearly every case, a combination of these elements has been present; hence,
it is difficult to determine the weight which the court attaches to any one of
them.
The Watson and Carter Cases
Two cases decided shortly after Mallory seem to place crucial emphasis on
the purpose for which arraignment was delayed. In Watson v. United States.
the District of Columbia Circuit held a delay of eighteen hours unlawful be-
cause it was designed to obtain incriminating statements through interroga-
tion.68 A confession secured under similar circumstances in Carter v. United
States was also held inadmissible; the accused had been detained fifteen hours
through a night of continual questioning, presumably for the purpose held
illegal in Watson.6 9 In both instances, the police had failed to notify the ac-
cused of his rights before questioning him.70 And, in Watson, the absence of a
proper warning seems to have influenced the finding of an illicit police mo-
tive.71 But Carter and Watson did not dispel the uncertainty generated by
Mallory as to warning: a subsequent District of Columbia case considered a
suitable warning as one of several factors validating a confession ;72 and still
another case indicated in a footnote that the failure to caution was harmless
error.73 To date, the legal effect of a preinterrogation warning remains largely
unexplained.
A more puzzling aspect of the Carter and Watson opinions is the lack of
discussion concerning the inaccessibility of committing officers. In both cases,
the arrests occurred after the usual working hours of a magistrate, and the
incriminating statements were obtained during the early hours of the morn-
67. See 1958 Senate Hearings 25-27. The Mallory doctrine has been applied in a
number of district court decisions. See id. at 93-101.
68. 249 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
69. 252 F.2d 608, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
70. Watson received no caution at all. 249 F.2d at 109. Carter was warned that he
need not speak only after he had orally confessed-the advice being inserted in the first
paragraph of his written confession. 252 F.2d at 619. The practice of warning an accused
of his rights prior to his signing a written statement but after interrogation seems pre-
valent among police. See 1958 House Hearings 37, 61; 1958 Senate Hearings 42; text
at note 32 supra. On the existence of any police warning whatsoever, see Letters from
Law Enforcement Officials to the Stanford Law Review, Nov. & Dec. 1952. The Mal-
lory decision may change police practice, however. See 1958 Senate Hearings 42, 398.
71. 249 F.2d at 109.
72. 'Milton Mvfallory v. United States, No. 14023, D.C. Cir., March 31, 1958, at 4.
73. Trilling v. United States, Nos. 13069, 13165, and 13212, D.C. Cir., April 17,
1958, at 14 n.15.
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ing.74 Though Mallory implies that delay may be "necessary" when commit-
ting officers are unavailable, Watson and Carter went off on other grounds.
Likewise, in Starr v. United States-in which the defendant had been arrested
at 1:00 a.m. and confessed seven to nine hours later-the accessibility issue
was disregarded. 75 The court simply stated that Mallory required exclusion.
Subsequent cases indicate, however, that the inaccessibility of committing
officers legalizes delay and postpones application of the McNabb rule.76 Even
if these later cases did not demonstrate that Watson, Carter, and Starr had
all invalidated confessions unnecessarily, Porter v. United States-in which
the accused had been arrested at 10:30 p.m. and had confessed about three-
quarters of an hour later--clearly held that unnecessary delay could occur
only during the usual professional hours of committing officers.
77
The Metoyer and Milton Mallory Cases
A later pair of cases focused on those "circumstances" which may justify
a brief delay. In Metoyer v. United States, the court, by a 2-1 vote, counte-
nanced a three-and-a-half hour detention which served principally to allow
the transcription of the accused's oral confession; he had voluntarily offered
the confession when the District of Columbia police confronted him.78 The
majority, holding both the oral and written confessions admissible, reasoned
that the Mallory opinion permits sufficient time to prepare a confession for
signature.79 Furthermore, the majority said, "every citizen has a right to in-
sist that the police make some . . . definitive inquiry before" the "stigma"
of arraignment attaches.80 The latter statement apparently overlooked the
"stigma" of arrest, and minimized the danger of police misconduct.
74. In Watson, the accused had made various oral admissions between 3:15 and
9:00 a.m. After 9:00 a.m., when committing officers became available, he re-enacted the
crime and consented to a search of his apartment which yielded some articles of cloth-
ing. The court held all three types of evidence inadmissible. 249 F.2d at 109. Carter,
arrested at 8:30 p.m., had confessed in writing by 7:30 a.m. and was arraigned at noon.
252 F.2d at 614.
75. No. 13865, D.C. Cir., Feb. 13, 1958.
76. See Milton Mallory v. United States, No. 14023, D.C. Cir., March 31, 1958, at
3-4; Trilling v. United States, Nos. 13069, 13165, and 13212, D.C. Cir., April 17, 1958,
at 9-10.
77. 258 F.2d 685, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Later admissions by the accused were not
considered exculpatory statements. Id. at 692-93; see note 10 supra.
Judge Bazelon, in dissent, asserted that a committing officer is always available in
the District of Columbia. 258 F.2d at 695. See also Garner v. United States, 174 F.2d
499, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (dissenting opinion), cert. deied, 337 U.S. 945 (1949);
Akowskey v. United States, 158 F.2d 649, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
78. 250 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
79. Id. at 32-33.
80. Id. at 33. The "stigma" argument has also been used by law-enforcement officials
seeking legislative overruling of McNabb. 1944 Hearings 46. See also 1958 House Bear-
inqs 2; 1058 Senate Hearings 35 (Mallory Rule).
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Chief Judge Edgerton, dissenting, agreed that the oral confession was ad-
missible, but felt that the written confession-made after a delay motivated
by "the desire of the police" to obtain it-should have been excluded.
8
'
In the other of these two cases, Milton Mallory v. United States, the ac-
cused (a nephew of the Mallory who prevailed in the Supreme Court),82 was
arrested while intoxicated at 8:00 in the evening, and jailed.8 3 In the mean-
time, hospital tests were conducted on the victim to confirm the alleged offense
of carnal knowledge. The next morning, after ten minutes of questioning, the
accused admitted the crime. He then was warned of his right to remain silent
and the possible effects of any statement he made. He signed a written con-
fession and was arraigned at noon. The majority, noting that the accused was
warned of his rights before he signed a statement, held the delay justified by
the defendant's drunken condition, the late hour of arrest, and the need to
verify the victim's story.84 Judge Bazelon argued in dissent that, even if some
delay were permissible pending examination of the complainant, since verifi-
cation had been completed during the night, the interval which ensued on the
morning after arrest was illegal because intended to permit interrogation. s
Judge Bazelon further asserted that the late hour of arrest did not justify the
delay inasmuch as the Government had conceded the accessibility of a com-
mitting officer,80 and that if drunkenness may delay arraignment, no inter-
rogation should be allowed until the accused is sufficiently sober to appear
before a magistrate.
8 7
Trilling v. United States
The first examination of the Mallory doctrine by the District of Columbia
Circuit en banc occurred in Trilling v. United States, and resulted in three
conflicting opinions.88 Trilling was arrested at 5:30 a.m. on a charge of bur-
glarizing a warehouse. At the time of arrest, the police had sufficient evidence
to constitute "probable cause" if not to establish the accused's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. After talking for about forty-five minutes with a police
sergeant who was a family friend, Trilling admitted burglarizing the ware-
house. He was then further detained and interrogated about other crimes still
unsolved by the police. Throughout the day, he made various oral admissions
and confessions and, toward 4:00 in the afternoon, one of the confessions
was put in writing and signed. Trilling was subsequently arraigned on the
81. 250 F.2d at 33-34.
82. 1958 Senate Hearings 6.
83. Milton Mallory v. United States, No. 14023, D.C. Cir., March 31, 1958.
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id. at 7-8.
86. Id. at 7; see note 77 supra.
87. Milton Mallory v. United States, supra note 83, at 8-9. See also Porter v. United
States, 258 F.2d 685, 693, 696 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion).
88. Nos. 13069, 13165, and 13212, D.C. Cir., April 17, 1958. The statement of facts
appearing in text is drawn from the court's opinion.
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basis of this confession. Even after arraignment, interrogation continued and
more incriminating statements were taken until 10:30 in the evening. Judge
Danaher, reluctantly joined by Judge Burger, held the confession of the ware-
house burglary admissible, but excluded all others. Judges Bazelon, Edgerton,
Fahy, and Washington were of the opinion that no statement obtained from
the accused was admissible; and Judges Bastian, Miller, and Prettyman voted
to admit all the evidence. The split in the court was such that Judge Dana-
her's conclusions received majority support.
Judge Danaher gave a strange twist to the Watson rationale that a delay
is illegal if its purpose is to obtain incriminating statements legitimizing an
arrest or establishing guilt."9 He apparently drew the negative inference that,
if a confession is not necessary to justify an arrest or to prove guilt, a delay
could not be illicitly motivated and therefore would not violate rule 5(a).19O
Since Trilling, at the time of his first confession, was not being detained in
order to extract statements from him or to subject him to a process of in-
quiry, Judge Danaher ruled that the initial confession was admissible.91 But,
the judge continued, after Trilling had made this confession, delay became
unlawful because the police had no evidence implicating him in crimes other
than the warehouse burglary. 2 The purpose of delay being to obtain incrimi-
nating statements to justify arrest and support guilt for these other crimes,
the subsequent confessions were held inadmissible.
Abstracted into a rule of law, the Danaher opinion would admit any evi-
dence challenged under Mallory provided the evidence, when obtained, is not
needed to establish guilt. So read, the opinion will not affect the outcome of
any case. Unlike the wrongful admission of coerced confessions, the inclusion
of evidence elicited in violation of rule 5(a) does not in itself constitute re-
versible error.0 3 And misapplication of the McNabb-Mallory doctrine does
not merit overturning a conviction if the evidence erroneously admitted is not
needed to establish the defendant's guilt.9 4 Judge Danaher thus concerned
himself with a question of admissibility which seems immaterial at the appel-
late level.
89. See id. at 14 & n.15.
90. Id. at 9. See also United States v. Simpson, 162 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1958).
91. Trilling v. United States, supra note 88, at 10.
92. Id. at 11-15.
93. Id. at 11 n.10; Porter v. United States, 258 F.2d 685, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
But see Trilling v. United States, supra at 33 (dissenting opinion).
Prior to Stein v. New York, 346 U2S. 156 (1953), the Supreme Court had indicated
that the admission into evidence of a confession obtained in violation of due process of
law would invalidate a conviction regardless of the sufficiency of evidence without the
confession. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401
(1945). Stein implied that if sufficient evidence existed in the absence of a coerced con-
fession, a conviction would stand. 346 U.S. at 188-92. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560,
568 & n.15 (1958), 21 GA. B.J. 1,16, did not follow this Stein dictum, however.
94. See note 93 supra; FED. R. Clm. P. 52(a); Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946); Haines v. United States, 188 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir.) (dic-
tum), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 888 (1951).
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Judge Prettyman, joined by Judges Bastian and Miller, read Mallory more
as forbidding coercive interrogation than as compelling prompt arraignment.
He stated that the interrogation leading to Trilling's initial confession did not
contain the elements of coercion supposedly deemed intolerable in Mallory.05
And, since the police are not required to arraign prior to normal business
hours, he concluded that the delay during which the first confession was ob-
tained was reasonable and therefore lawful under rule 5(a).11 Turning to the
confessions of and admissions concerning other crimes, Judge Prettyman
found them admissible by categorizing Trilling as a "suspect" not under arrest
for those offenses at the time he was questioned about them. 7 The judge
reasoned that rule 5 (a) applies only to "arrested persons," and that the police
may interrogate a suspect as long as the questioning is "reasonable-for-the-
purposes-of-information.19 8 This standard, he declared, was met.
Judge Prettyman's view of unlawful delay as just another factor going to
the voluntariness of a confession seems inconsistent with the McNabb rule.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the exclusion of evidence under Mc-
Nabb does not in any way depend upon proof of coercion, 99 and that a vio-
lation of rule 5 (a) need not be a violation of due process.100 More ominously,
judge Prettyman would incorporate into rule 5(a) a novel distinction be-
tween "suspect" and "arrested person." The distinction suggests that arrest
occurs at some point after the police have taken an individual into custody
and questioned him. Historically, however, any taking into custody to secure
the administration of justice has constituted an arrest ;101 and a prior period
of detention for interrogation is unknown to federal law and is permissible
in but a small minority of state jurisdictions.10 2 Indeed, were prearrest deten-
95. See Trilling v. United States, supra note 88, at 59.
96. Id. at 59-60.
97. See id. at 61.
98. See id. at 48-49; see note 1 supra.
99. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 68 (1944) ; Note, 66 YA.LE L.J. 270, 278
n.33 (1956) (defendants seldom able to show coercion).
100. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) ; see Gallegos v. Nebraska,
342 U.S. 55, 64 (1951); Watts v. Indiana, 333 U.S. 49, 50 n.1 (1949).
101. 1 ALEXANDER, ARREST 353-54 (1949); DAX & TiBBs, ARREST, SEaRCH AND
SEIZURE 6 (1946); Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REv. 201 (1940). Arrest
includes detention by the police. 22 Ops. ATrr'y GEN. 51 (1898); Waite, The Law of
Arrest, 24 TEXAS L. Rzv. 279, 296-97 (1946); Note, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182, 1185-88
(1952). For a general treatment of arrests under federal law, see Orfield, Warrant of
Arrest and Summons Upon Complaint in Federal Crimninal Procedure, 27 U. CiNc. L.
REv. 1 (1958). Compare Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure, Report,
CmD. No. 3297, at 55-59 (1929) (arrest and detention in England).
102. For the minority jurisdictions, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1901-02 (1953);
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 41, § 98 (1952); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 (1955); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-1 (1957). These laws are all similar to Uniform Arrest Act
§ 2 which allows the detention of certain persons for a period not to exceed two hours.
See Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 320-24 (1942). See general-
ly Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Rav. 16 (1957).
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tion permitted, the protection afforded by ilcNabb would be slight, for the
police could delay arrest until after interrogation. And Judge Prettyman
would merely require that prearrest questioning be "reasonable-for-the-pur-
poses-of-information."
To Judge Bazelon, with whom Chief Judge Edgerton concurred, Mallory
meant that all confessions elicited through questions put to an arrested per-
son before his arraignment must be excluded,10 3 and that all of Trilling's
statements were therefore inadmissible. The judge termed the hour of arrest
irrelevant, because a committing officer is always available within the District
of Columbia. 10 4 Furthermore, he stated, if delay does become necessary, the
police may not use the interval to acquire incriminating evidence by question-
ing the prisoner.10 Nor will a proper preinterrogation cautioning of the de-
fendant as to his rights render his answers admissible, since the law reserves
that function to the magistrate and not the police. 10 6 This last assertion finds
apparent support in the McNabb dictum that the power of the criminal law
is too awful to leave in the possession of the police alone.'
07
In seeking to prohibit all interrogation prior to arraignment, Judge Bazelon
departs markedly from prior case law. His attempt to protect defendants
against questioning occasioned by necessary delays may represent a desirable
policy; but every decision from McNabb through Mallory geared the admis-
sibility of evidence to violations of prompt-arraignment legislation. Those
cases impose no limit on interrogation so long as rule 5(a) is complied with.
Heideman v. United States
Heidentan v. United States at last presented the court with the sharp issue
of how much interrogation is permissible in the absence of collateral con-
siderations.108 There, the accused had been questioned for fifteen minutes and
then had given a full confession. He was arraigned approximately an hour
after arrest-a delay, according to the court, no longer than that essential to
complete ordinary administrative procedures. The court held that the brief
period of questioning had been sufficiently curtailed to be lawful, that, indeed,
the evidence affirmatively showed nothing more than an appropriate inquiry
to ensure that the accused was properly charged.' 0 9 To support this conclu-
sion, the court outlined the extent of a proper inquiry: the police may ask
the accused what he knows about the crime; they may reveal the evidence
which they have already gathered and ask him if he wishes to comment upon
it; they may ask him if he has anything further to say."10 In the court's view,
103. Trilling v. United States, supra note 88. at 18.
104. Id. at 20; see note 77 supra.
105. Trilling v. United States, supra note 88, at 22-23.
106. Id. at 27 n.13.
107. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
108. No. 14414, D.C. Cir., Sept. 25, 1958.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 5.
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questioning becomes unlawful only when it constitutes "grilling" or continues
beyond the brief period allowable for routine administrative action.' While
the term "grilling" is equally as vague as "process of inquiry," Heidemnan's
enumeration of permissible questions affords more certainty than did the lan-
guage in Mallory. At least, when committing officers are readily available and
when no justifying "circumstances" are present, Heideman provides compara-
tively definite standards by which the police may act.
Summary
The efforts of the District of Columbia appellate court, examined together,
do not dispel the confusion which surrounds the Mallory opinion. Although
Watson and Carter indicate otherwise, the inaccessibility of committing offi-
cers apparently serves to toll the operation of McNabb. Still unclear is
whether the police can legalize an interrogation by advising the accused that
he may retain counsel or that anything he says may be used against him.
While a start has been made toward detailing the "circumstances" justifying
delay, the list-which now includes drunkenness, identification of the arrested
person, transcription of an oral confession, and verification of the accused's or
victim's story-is necessarily incomplete. Determining the delay which par-
ticular "circumstances" may warrant is also fraught with difficulty. Heideman
alone addresses the problem of an interrogation's permissible length and sets
standards enabling the police to ascertain the legality of their conduct. But
its particular fact situation-divorced from the accessibility problem, from
justifying "circumstances," and from the effect of a proper police warning-
precludes a substantial contribution to predictability.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE McNABB DocTRINE: AN ANALYSIS
Interrogation as a Source of Confessions
The Argument
The McNabb rule has been under constant fire from law-enforcement offi-
cers since its formulation."12 The congressional hearings provoked by McNabb
and by Mallory are filled with vigorous official complaints that the police and
other investigating agencies will be deprived of an opportunity to interrogate
arrested persons thoroughly and, as a result, will be unable to secure sufficient
evidence to convict the perpetrators of many serious crimes. 113 Confessions,
111. Ibid.
112. E.g., Statement of Joseph T. Votava, United States Attorney for the District of
Nebraska, 1 COwAi ENTs, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED CONCERNING
THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 39 (1943)
[hereinafter cited as COMMENTS]; Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States
Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 442 (1948) ; Wickersham, The Supreme Court and
Federal Criminal Procedure, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 14, 22-23 (1958).




the argument runs, are the most important source of criminal convictions: the
vast majority of successful prosecutions follow pleas of guilty which in turn
are preceded by confessions or damaging admissions.1 4 And, in contested
cases, a confession is of course most telling evidence against the accused.
Furthermore, it is claimed, incriminating statements are rarely obtained with-
out prior interrogation ;115 besides, questioning produces more information and
evidence than any other investigative activity "16 and is particularly essential
when a skilled criminal is accused, for, having probably acted in the absence
of witnesses, he alone can divulge the truth." 7
Commentary
The importance of interrogation seems incontestable." 8 Incriminating state-
ments, even if not always indispensable to an effective prosecution, are valu-
able evidence which should not be frivolously excluded. 119 On the other hand,
the powerful impact of such statements-especially of confessions--on a trier
of facts dictates that courts scrutinize them closely for trustworthiness before
admitting them into evidence.1 20 Moreover, the value of incriminating evi-
dence to the prosecution may tempt overzealous police to indulge in brutal or
shocking extractive methods. 121 "Due process" therefore requires that an ac-
cused's statement, to be admissible, have been elicited under circumstances
which neither impeach its reliability nor suggest outrageous police conduct. 122
Opponents of McNabb do not espouse a change in constitutional doctrine.
They simply insist that the police be allowed to undertake noncoercive in-
quiries leading to the acquisition of reliable evidence. 123 In other words, they
would permit any method of questioning permissible under the Constitution.
114. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, 1 COMMENTS 32. Compare Inbau, supra note
112, at 447; Note, 28 IND. L.J. 374, 388 (1953).
115. See 'MULBAR, INTERROGATION 33 (1951) [hereinafter cited as MULBAR]; 1958
House Hearings 36; 1958 Senate Hearings 70.
116. MULBAR 3; see KIDD, POLICE INTERROGATION 13-14 (.1940) [hereinafter cited as
KIDD]; Day, An Instructional Approach to Criminal Interrogation, Police, May-June
1958, p. 47.
117. 1958 House Hearings 33 (Statement of Robert V. Murray, Chief of Police,
Metropolitan Police Dep't, Washington, D.C.); see Note, 60 YAI.E L.J. 1228 n.2 (1951).
118. Gee S. REP. No. 1478, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1958).
1.19. See 3 WIxsoRE, EvIDENCE § 866 (3d ed. 1940); Coe, Practices of Police and
Prosecution Prior to Trial, 17 LAw. GuiLD Rav. 62, 63-64 (1957).
120. See 3 WIGMoRE, EviDWNcE, § 822 (3d ed. 1940); MONSTERBERG, ON THE WIT-
NESS STAND 143-44 (1949).
121. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936); Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
122. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv.
411 (1954) (collecting authorities) ; see note 15 supra. The same test apparently applies
both to admissions and confessions. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274, 278 (1946) ;
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621 (1896); Comment, 4 KAN. L. Ray. 108
(1955). But see Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 162 n.5 (1953).
123. See INBAU & REID, LIE DETEcTION AND CRIMINAL INTFRROGATION 195-97 (3d
ed. 1943) [hereinafter cited as INBAU & REID]; 1958 Senate Hearings 35; Inbau, The
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If the fruits of police interrogation are deemed admissible whenever no
constitutional violation can be shown, the accused may be inadequately pro-
tected. In the face of police testimony stoutly denying any irregularity, a de-
fendant is often unable to prove a constitutional violation when one in fact
exists. 124 Evidence of mental coercion may be especially elusive. A court, in
weighing the constitutionality of admitting an allegedly coerced confession,
must measure the effect of police methods upon the individual defendant."'2
True, varying periods of interrogation have been held unconstitutional de-
pending upon such demonstrable facts as the education, intelligence, and gen-
eral background of the accused .'2 ' But allegations of momentary tensions or
underlying psychological deviations which might aggravate the suggestiveness
of interrogation are difficult to substantiate. 2 7 Thus, to avoid saddling the
accused with an unconscionable evidentiary burden, a rule more rigid than
the "due process" ban on protracted interrogation seems necessary.
The need for a strict rule is heightened by the fact that law-enforcement
authorities, crowding the edges of "due process," have developed elaborate
and refined methods of interrogation designed to obtain as many "voluntary"
self-incriminating statements as possible. While eschewing coercion, the police
place an accused at a carefully calculated psychological disadvantage. He is
taken from the reassuring atmosphere of his home and its reminders of his
individual rights.12 8 He is questioned with a minimum of interruption, pre-
ferably in a special room devoid of anything which might distract his atten-
tion and lessen the omnipresence of interrogation. 29 Ideally, the interrogator
has learned as much as possible beforehand about the alleged offense and
about the background and personality of the accused. °30 Special tactics for
exploiting individual psychic phenomena are used with various types of sus-
Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 Ij. L. REv. 442, 462
(1948); ABA STATEMENT 280.
124. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1958) (dissenting opinion);
Smith, Public Interest and the Interests of the Accused in, the Criminal Process-Reflec-
tions of a Scottish Lawyer, 32 TUL. L. REV. 349, 354 (1958) ; Bader, Coerced Confes-
sions and the Due Process Clause, 15 BRooKLYN L. REV. 51, 70 (1948). Because charges
of coercion are freely bandied about, courts view them skeptically. See, e.g., Stein v.
New York, 346 U.S. 156, 181 (1953).
125. See Stein v. New York, supra note 124, at 192; Thomas v. Arizona. 354 U.S.
390, 393 (1958) ; Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957).
126. See Fikes v. Alabama, supra note 125, at 197; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
52-53 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 63-64 (1949).
127. See MUjSTERBFRG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 150-53 (1949) (melancholia):
Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 69 (1952) (pathological accusation); Note, 28 IND. Lj.
374, 380-82 (1953) (general psychological deviations).
128. See O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 99 (1956) [here-
inafter cited as O'HARA]; DIENSTEaIN, TECHNICS FOR THE CRIME INVESTIGATOR 100
(1952) [hereinafter cited as DIENSTEIN] ; KInD 55-56.
129. INBAU & REID 142-47; O'HA 100-01; KIDD 58, 60; MULBAR 11.




pects.13 ' Above all, the interrogator should not hurry.1 3 2 Passing time will
show the accused that he must be prepared to resist indefinitely.' Many
hours may be consumed confronting him with previously gathered incriminat-
ing evidence, or developing and underscoring inconsistencies in an original
statement. If he is a hardened criminal, he may encounter prolonged proceed-
ings intended to impress him with the dominance and relentlessness of his in-
quisitors.
1 34
The Utility of Prearraignment Interrogation
The Argument
Building on the assumption that self-incriminating statements, and therefore
interrogation, are indispensable to law enforcement, McNabb's detractors urge
that the doctrine prevents interrogation during the only period in which ques-
tioning can be effective, the period before arraignment. They claim that, once
an individual is brought before a committing officer, the police lose "control"
of him and cannot continue their inquiry. 3 5 In the absence of "probable
cause," the accused must be set free ;136 and, if "probable cause" can be shown,
either he is admitted to bail and immunized from police questioning, or else
he is committed to the custody of a United States marshal, who will take him
to a jail where, it is asserted, the police cannot subject him to unwanted
questioning.13 7 Difficulties engendered by losing "control" over the accused
are increased for the police by the magistrate's warning him that he need not
make a statement and that any statement he does make can be used against
him.' 38 The accused's psychological resistance to interrogation is thus bol-
stered. Furthermore, the magistrate notifies the accused of his right to retain
counsel,139 and a lawyer's first step will often be to advise his client to remain
silent.140 Consequently, the police seek not only an opportunity to question but
an opportunity to question before arraignment.141
Commentary
Rule 5(a), as interpreted by the Supreme Court, presumes that any delay
allowing police interrogation prior to arraignment represents so great a threat
131. DIENsTEIN 108-15; KiDD 77-186; O'HARA 102-10, 1.12-14.
132. DIENSTEIn 103; KIDD 74-75; MULBAR 22.
133. See Kmd 75.
134. See O'HARA 112. Although a half hour's interrogation may suffice in some cases,
others may require a much longer period of inquiry. See INzBu & RED 185; 1958 House
Hearings 38, 58, 66-67; 1944 Hearings 9. *See generally Horowitz, The Psychology of
Confession, 47 J. CGRI. L., C. & PS. 197 (1956).
135. See note 8 supra.
136. See note 3 supra.
137. See note 5 supra; 1958 House Hearings 42.
138. See note 2 supra.
139. See ibid.
140. See 1958 House Hearings 36; note 213 infra.
141. Id. at 42.
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of coercion that the delay ought to be prohibited whenever feasible. Thus, "un-
necessary delay" evokes evidentiary exclusion. Nonetheless, a brief period of
questioning probably does not constitute a substantial danger of coercion. The
temptation to resort to brutality is ever present, but it would appear a com-
paratively easy one for the police to resist so long as they have hope of obtain-
ing a statement through interrogation. Once long periods of questioning have
proved unsuccessful, however, the patience of the interrogator is likely to be-
come frayed, his better judgment weakened, and the threat of brutality most
serious. Moreover, the psychologically coercive potentialities of interrogation
appear in large measure a function of its duration. Untrustworthy statements
may, of course, be given without any interrogation at all. 142 But the Supreme
Court has yet to strike down on constitutional grounds a statement elicited
solely by means of a short interrogation. 43 Only as questioning proceeds, in-
creasing its suggestive impact on the accused, whose situation of stress mag-
nifies his suggestibility, does the probability of coercion generally become
serious.'4 4
Irrespective of the danger of coercion, interrogation must be restricted in
order to avoid inordinate harassment of the innocent. Not every arrested per-
son is a criminal offender; and police interrogation is a discomforting if not
frightening experience. The wrongly accused, separated from family and
friends and detained incommunicado for an indefinite period of time, may
be subjected to a grueling ordeal which, even if within the limits of "due
process," is undesirable. 145
Indeed, the McNabb doctrine appears in its most salutary aspect as a pre-
ventive against police arrests motivated not by "probable cause" but by a
desire to interrogate suspects. Arrests of the innocent are inevitable, to be
sure, but their frequency is reduced by the requirement that the police, before
interfering with an individual's freedom, have probable cause to believe that
he has committed or is committing an offense.146 The fact that this safeguard
142. ARaLDo, PSYCHOLOGY APPu To LEGAL EvIDENCE AND OTHER CoNsTRucrIONS
OF LAW 337 (1913); 1958 House Hearings 3; see Note, 28 IND. L.J. 374, 378-79, 382(.1953).
143. Justice Douglas has suggested construing the i1lcNabb rule as a constitutional
one under the "due process" clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 56 (1949) (concurring opinion) ; see 1944 Hearings 29-31.
144. See SARGANT, BATTLE FOR THE MIND 186, 188 (1-957); Note, 28 IND. L.J. 374,
380 (1953).
145. See ABA STATEMENT 13-15.
146. "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the
officers'] knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an of-
fense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76
(1949), quoting from Carroll v. United States, 267 U,,S. 132, 162 (1925). To the same
effect, see Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878) ; STmrwas, ARREST 43 (1930).
When arrest is made upon a warrant, a showing of "probable cause" is a prerequisite
to issuance of the warrant. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV; e.g., West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78,
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is widely disregarded 147 does not legalize the infringement of individual
rights. And the contention that McNabb unwisely prevents the questioning
of persons as to whom "probable cause" cannot be shown is essentially an
argument for detention on suspicion. 48 Basically foreign to the common law,149
such detention, if available, would encourage wholesale arrests on the flim-
siest of evidence '5 0 by allowing the police to interrogate in order to establish
the "probable cause" which should exist before an accused is taken into cus-
tody.' 5 ' Assuredly, no societal gain through more efficacious law enforcement
can justify the arbitrary arrest and questioning of substantial numbers of
innocent people. 15 2 2IcNabb's restriction on prearraignment interrogation re-
duces the likelihood of such treatment, since "probable cause" must be estab-
lished when an accused is first brought before a committing officer.
The need for prearraignment interrogation might be avoided altogether if
the police were allowed to question an accused once a committing officer found
"probable cause."'1 3 The present practice of immunizing an arraigned person
85, 87 (1894); United -States v. Kennedy, 5 F.R.D. 310, 312 (D. Colo. 1946). For the
form of a federal warrant, see FED. R. Cami. P. 4(b) (1).
The police must also have "probable cause" to arrest without a warrant. ALI, CODE
OF CRIMrNAL PROCEDaE 231-38 (1931) (collecting authorities); 1 ALEXANDER, ARREST
441 (1949); 4 WHARTON, CnxmiN.tt LAw AND PROCEDURE §§ 1595-97 (Anderson ed.
1957). In the case of a misdemeanor, an arrest without a warrant may occur only when
the crime is committed in the presence of an arresting officer. ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 231-34 (1931) (collecting authorities); 1 ALEXANDER, ARREST 435 (1949);
4 WHARTON, op. cit. supra § 1597. Arrest without a warrant by a federal officer is gov-
erned, in the absence of statute, by the law of the state in which the arrest is made.
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589-90 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 15 n.5 (1948); Seawell v. United States, 243 F.2d 909, 912 (4th Cir. 1957).
See Orfield, Warrant of Arrest and Summons Upon Complaint in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 27 U. CiNc. L. REv. 1, 52-54 (1958).
147. American Bar Ass'n Comm. on Lawless Enforcement of Law, Report, 1 Am.
J. POLICE ScI. 575 (1930) ; Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv.
16, 27 (1957); HopxiNs, OUR LAWLEsS POLICE 61-75 (1931).
148. "Suspicion" in this context is something less than "probable cause." See, e.g.,
Foote, supra note 147, at 18.
149. ALI, CODE OF CRImiNAL PROCEDURE 236 (1931) (collecting authorities); see
note 101 supra. But see Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rzv. 315, 318-19
('1942) ; note 102 supra.
150. Ninety persons were arrested in a recent dragnet in the District of Columbia.
1958 Senate Hearings 40, 78.
151. This is precisely what is forbidden by Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449,
456 (1957).
152. Police also use vagrancy and similar charges.to justify arrests for questioning.
See Foote, Vagrancy-type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1956) ;
Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. Cm. L.
REv. 345, 369 (1936) ; Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1351 (1950).
,153. The "probable cause" referred to is the probable cause to prosecute determined
at a preliminary hearing at which the accused may present evidence, FED. R. CRIM. P.
5(c), rather than the evidence needed by the police to justify an arrest without a war-
rant, see note 146 supra.
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from interrogation does not rest on inviolable principles of law.154 The Con-
stitution would appear to permit the suspension of bail pending a brief period
of judicially authorized interrogation.' L5 And the Supreme Court has held that
the police may question an accused whom a commissioner has committed. 50
In fact, prior to the McNabb decision, the United States marshals in the Dis-
trict of Columbia-under whose custody the great majority of federally ac-
cused persons are placed pending trial-regularly returned them to the police
for interrogation.157
Nevertheless, law-enforcement authorities contend that, given "probable
cause" and an opportunity for postarraignment interrogation, effective inquiry
is undercut when the accused is warned that he may remain silent, that any-
thing he says may be used against him, and that he may retain counsel.' 58
If this is so, questioning an accused after he has been advised of his rights
by an arraigning commissioner will not solve the difficulties which McNabb
poses for the police. The committing officer's warnings and the opportunity
to retain counsel might, however, be postponed until after a brief period of
judicially authorized interrogation. 159
Additional Arguments
Arraignment as a Signal to the Accused's Confederates
Critics of McNabb protest that the speedy appearance of an accused in
arraignment proceedings serves to warn his confederates that their own crim-
inal activity may have been discovered.6 0 Since much of modern crime springs
from highly organized, cooperative effort, and since arraignment is a public
proceeding subject to newspaper coverage, many offenders, it is alleged, will
benefit from the strict enforcement of rule 5(a).'6'
Actually, the publicity of arraignment can prejudice the police only when
confederates are so unaware of each other's activities that one of them can
undergo arrest without his partners knowing it. Moreover, the argument that
prompt arraignment aids the underworld leads to the conclusion that incom-
municado detention is permissible so long as the fact of arrest can be kept
154. See 1958 House Hearings 42; 1944 Hearings 6.
155. See notes 206-09 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Comment, 7 BuFFALo L. Rav.
427, 433-34 (1958). Under the present procedure, bail is postponed whenever a commit-
ting officer is unavailable, since such officers alone have the power to fix bail. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3041, 3141 (1952) ; 28 U.S.C. § 637 (1952); FED. R. Cas." P. 5(b).
156. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951).
157. 1944 Neaings 6-7.
158. See 1958 House Hearings 36-37;' note 2 supra.
159. See notes 214-18 in.fra and accompanying text.
When an accused is proceeded against by indictment or information, a commissioner
need not warn him of his rights. FED. R. Cran. P. 9(c) (1) ; see United States v. Pickard,
217 F.2d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1953).
160. 1958 Senate Hearings 35; 1944 Hearings 35; ABA STATE-VENT 4-5.
161. See 1958 Senate Hearbigs 31, 35.
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secret. Such detention practically suspends the writ of habeas corpus 102 and
subjects the accused to the probability of coercion which arises from police
detention for indefinite periods of time. On those rare occasions when secrecy
is in fact necessary, it could be achieved less horrendously by providing for
arraignment in camera. 16e
The Intended Reach of Rule 5(a)
Opponents of McNabb further maintain that the draftsmen of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure did not intend that rule 5(a) be enforced by
the exclusion of evidence.'6 This argument finds support in the fact that a
provision based on McNabb was deleted from the rules as originally proposed.
The first preliminary draft stipulated that any statement made by an accused
in response to interrogation would be inadmissible as evidence against him if
the interrogation occurred during "unnecessary delay."' r5 This provision did
not appear in the second preliminary draft, was not again considered by the
Supreme Court's Advisory Committee,' 6" and was omitted from the rules as
approved by the Court.10 7 From this deletion, critics of McNabb have inferred
that the Advisory Committee sought to nullify McNabb itself.168
Whether or not this inference is correct, it seems irrelevant. Congress
granted the Supreme Court the power to formulate the Criminal Rules, 169
and the Court appointed the Advisory Committee simply to aid in the task. 70
Therefore, even in the face of an implicit Committee repudiation of McNabb,
the intent of the Court must govern. And the Court has declared emphatically
that rule 5 (a) in no way detracts from McNabb.'7 '
162. See ABA STATE&SENT 13-14.
163. See United States v. Klapholz, 17 F.R.D. 18, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Orfield,
Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Procedure, 19 U. PiTt. L.
REv. 489, 563 (1958); ABA STATEMENT 39.
164. 1958 House Hearings 4-5, -178; 1958 Senate Hearings 53-54.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were drafted by an Advisory Committee
appointed by the Supreme Court. Order Appointing Advisory Committee on Rules in
Criminal Cases, 312 U.S. 717 (1941) ; Order, 323 U.S. 821 (1944) ; Order, 327 U.S. 825
(1946). After being approved by the Court, the Rules were submitted to Congress and
have the effect of law. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1952) ; Ochoa v. United States, 167 F.2d 341,
345 (9th Cir. 1948).
The general approach of the Advisory Committee is discussed in Holtzoff, Partici-
pation of the Bar i& Judicial Rule-Making, 3 F.R.D. 165, 166 (1943). An exhaustive
history of rule 5 is presented by Qrfield, Proce.edings Before the Commissioner in Fed-
eral Criminal Procedure,-19 U..P'rr. L. Rnv. 489-504 (1958).
165. FED. R, Ca n. P. -5b). (First Preliminary Draft, 1943).
166. Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Procedure,
19 U. Pirr. L. REv. 489, 502-03 (1958).
167. Order, 323 U.S. 821 (1944).
168. E.g., S. REI. No. 1478, 85th Cong., 2d 'Sess. 5 (1958) (letter from Judge Holt-
zoff).
169. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3772 (1952).
170. 312 U.S. 716 (1941).
171. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957); Upshaw v. United States,
335 U.S. 410 (1948).
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Furthermore, the purpose behind the Committee's deletion of proposed rule
5(b) is not at all clear. After the first preliminary draft was published, at-
tacks on the rule were made in the press, letters to the Committee, and judi-
cial conferences. 172 Much of this criticism came from United States Attorneys
and other law-enforcement officials who opposed McNabb in strength.173 On
the other hand, considerable adverse comment derived not from an over-
whelming dislike for McNabb but from the fact that the Committee had in-
corporated a canon of evidence into a set of procedural rules.174 This step
was deemed unnecessary, for the Supreme Court had already decided Mc-
Nabb, and undesirable, for it crystallized into statute an evidentiary doctrine
better left, so it was said, to case-law evolution.175 Among the members of
the Committee were both friends and foes of McNabb, and their motives for
deleting proposed rule 5(b) were undoubtedly varied.176 If they had really
intended to overrule McNabb, they could have proposed a specific provision
to that effect rather than content themselves with ambiguous silence. In sum,
the deletion of proposed 5(b) was hardly tantamount to disapproving Mc-
Nabb.
THE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO MALLORY
The Willis-Keating Bill
Of the congressional proposals provoked by Mallory, the Willis-K eating
Bill lived the longest. In the process, it compiled a colorful history. 77 The
bill as passed by the House provided, first, that any evidence otherwise ad-
missible should not be excluded solely because of "delay" in taking an arrested
172. This material appears in 1 & 2 COmMENTS.
173. E.g., 1 id. at 32-38, 39; 2 id. at 328-29, 336a.
174. 2 id. at 327.
175. 1 id. at 29.
176. Compare Dession, The Nea' Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (pt. 1.), 55
YA.E L.J. 694, 707 (1946), with Judge Holtzoff's view in S. REP. No. 1478, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1958). Both men were members of the Advisory Committee.
177. The Willis-Keating Bill read as follows:
(a) Evidence, including statements and confessions, otherwise admissible, shall not
be inadmissible solely because of delay in taking an arrested person before a com-
missioner or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses
against the laws of the United States.
(b) No statement, including -a confession, made by an arrested person during an
interrogation by a law-enforcement officer shall be admissible unless prior to such
interrogation the arrested person had been advised that he is not required to -make
a statement and that any statement made by him may be used against him.
H.R. 11477, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
Other bills inspired by the Mallory decision included H.R. 8624, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1958) (by Rep. Poff, prohibiting exclusion solely because of delay in arraignment) ; S.
2970, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (by Sen. Eastland, same); S. 3325, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1958) (by Sen. Morse, providing a preinterrogation procedure for the police);
S. 3355, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (by Sen. Butler, requiring arraignment within
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person before a committing officer ;178 but, second, that no statements elicited
from an arrested person before arraignment would be admissible unless the
police, prior to questioning him, had advised him that he need not speak and
that anything he said could be used against him. The bill was reported out
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary with its first provision amended to
read "reasonable delay" instead of "delay.' 79 Several Senators suggested that
the amended provision would not change the meaning of rule 5 (a) as enforced
by McNabb because "unnecessary" and "unreasonable" are synonymous.'
Senator O'Mahoney, the amendment's sponsor, stated that the bill would in
no way weaken the command for prompt arraignment,' 8' but that it would
not exclude constitutionally obtained evidence unless an unreasonable delay
had ensued.'8 2 Senator Carroll, on the other hand, who supported the
O'Mahoney amendment at length, apparently felt that its whole purpose was
to frustrate Senate passage of the House bill.' s8 He and others appeared re-
signed to some form of anti-Mallory legislation, and sought to confine it to
an insignificant change in existing law.184 They had their way, for no bill
became law.
During the closing days of Congress, a crucial vote in a senatorial cam-
paign against the Supreme Court passed the O'Mahoney amendment 41-
39;18r, the bill as amended was approved 65-12.186 The House refused to
accept the amendment, and the measure went to conference.'8 7 There, the
twelve hours of arrest). The Willis-Keating Bill was the only measure to pass either
chamber. See N.Y. Times, July 3, 1958, p. 8, col. 6. See generally Hogan & Snee, The
McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1, 33-46 (1958).
A new bill, H.R. 4957, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), identical to Willis-Keating as
above cited, is presently being considered by the full House Committee on the Judiciary
after being favorably reported by a subcommittee. 105 CONG. REc. D135 (daily ed. March
5, 1959). Similar bills have been introduced in both chambers, see 27 U.S.L. WEEK 2392
(Gen. Pt. 1959) ; Washington Post & Times Herald, March 6, 1959, p. D1, col. 1; H.R.
2918, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
178. Compare the Hobbs Bill, note 25 sapra.
179. S. REP. No. 2252, 85th Gong., 2d Sess. ('1958).
180. 104 CONG. REc. 17041, 17046-47, 17081-82, 17095, 17098 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1958).
181. Id. at 17041-42.
182. Id. at 17041, 17052, 17056. Senator O'Mahoney preferred "unreasonable" to
"unnecessary" in regard to the rule of evidence because he felt that "unnecessary" had
been given an automatic or mechanical definition by the courts. He was also impressed
by the tradition accompanying "unreasonable," which had its roots in the fourth amend-
ment, while "unnecessary" was a newcomer to the scene, making its appearance upon
the adoption of rule 5(a). Id. at 17041, 17082. The Senator's history of the word "un-
necessary" in its pertinent context is incorrect. "Without unnecessary delay" was read
into prompt-arraignment statutes by the courts prior to the adoption of rule 5 (a). See
note 12 supra.
183. See 104 CoNG. REc. 17056, 17098 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1958).
184. See id. at 17095-96; 104 id. at 18082 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
185. 104 Coxa. REc. 171.16 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1958).
186. Id. at 17125. Amendments proposed by Senator Ervin and Senator Morse were
defeated. Id. at 17116-24.
187. Id. at 17125; 104 id. at 17277 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1958).
1959] 1029
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
House conferees-evidently after protesting that the O'Mahoney amendment
would not overrule but adopt the Mallory decision '-succeeded in append-
ing to the Willis-Keating Bill a new proviso which would make "[reasonable]
delay... an element in determining the voluntary or involuntary nature of
... statements or confessions."' 8 9 The proviso, although designed to force
the judiciary to read "reasonable delay" as any interval which would not
impel constitutional exclusion,190 did not seem to change the meaning of the
bill appreciably. All it accomplished was a funeral, for, when the bill returned
to the Senate, Senator Carroll claimed on a point of order that the conference
version contained new matter that had not been considered in either cham-
ber.'91 At 4:10 in the morning, directly preceding adjournment, Vice-Presi-
dent Nixon sustained the point of order, and the Willis-Keating Bill went
dramatically down to defeat. 192
The Shortcomings of Willis-Keating
All three forms of the Willis-Keating Bill were inadequate. The Senate's
version, by allowing the courts to exclude evidence obtained during an "un-
reasonable" delay, simply codified McNabb with all its ambiguities.9 3 Indeed,
the new terminology threatened to jettison the sketchy definition of "unneces-
sary delay" found in the decisions. The policy behind the McNabb-Mallory
rule---essentially one of deterrence-cannot operate successfully unless clear
standards enable law-enforcement authorities to know when their conduct will
prove illegal and their inquisitorial efforts useless. Otherwise, police seeking
to obey the law may violate it unknowingly, infringe upon defendants' rights
unnecessarily, and void the convictions of guilty persons unwittingly.
The proviso which the conference committee added did not cure the defects
of the Senate amendment. Although apparently designed to restore the sub-
stance of the original House measure, the proviso was so poorly drafted that
it could easily have been read not as limiting the effect of the Senate amend-
ment but as partially codifying the "due process" prohibition against involun-
tary confessions. 9 4
As passed by the House, Willis-Keating was also unsatisfactory. It would
have permitted the police to detain an arrested person for as long as "due
process" permits provided they first warned him of his rights.'; Such deten-
188. Hogan & Snee, supra note 177, at 44-45.
189. H.R. REP. No. 2702, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
190. See Hogan & Snee, supra note 177, at 45. The conference report does not make
the proviso's purpose abundantly clear See H.R. REP. No. 2702, 85th Cong., 2d SesS.
(1958).
191. See 104 CONG. REc. 18082-83, 18093-96, 18100-01 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
192. See id. at 18101.
193. See notes 179-84 supra and accompanying text.
194. jSee 104 CONG. REc. 18082-83 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1958).
195. See note 177 supra.
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tion would encompass not only the likelihood of unprovable coercion but also
an incommunicado holding of the accused in derogation of his right to habeas
corpus.")" Furthermore, the bill would encourage arrests on suspicion followed
by periods of prearraignment detention used to secure evidence upon which
the illegal arrests could be justified. While a warning to the accused that he
may remain silent and that anything he says can be used against him might
bolster his resistance to psychological pressures, a warning, to be effective,
should come from a judicial officer rather than the police. Law-enforcement
agents who routinely deny coercing confessions could overlook their duty to
warn and subsequently swear that a warning was given. More important, an
accused frequently will not understand his rights unless they are explained
to him at length, and it is highly doubtful that the police, devoted to tracking
down criminal offenders, will pause in their headlong quest for information
in order to bring home to an ignorant suspect the meaning of his constitu-
tional heritage.
Neither the legislative nullification of McNabb without more nor the sub-
stitute rule embodied in the original Willis-Keating proposal would adequate-
ly secure an accused from illegal arrest and prearraignment coercion. On the
other hand, the present operation of the McNabb-Mallory doctrine needlessly
inhibits police questioning whenever a committing officer is readily accessible.
In fact, a magistrate's accessibility is a circumstance totally divorced from the
threat of coercion which McNabb is designed to counter. Rule 5 (a), however,
by forbidding all "unnecessary delay," invites an evidentiary rule predicated
on the feasibility of arraignment. A modification not of McNabb-Mallory but
of the underlying "unnecessary delay" approach is therefore indicated. Other-
wise, the fortuitous availability of commiting officers or the chance presence
of other circumstances rendering arraignment infeasible, rather than the like-
lihood of coercion, will continue to determine the admissibility of evidence
gleaned through police interrogation.
A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TIE FEDERAL RULES
Judicially Authorized Interrogation
At present, evidence may be elicited from an accused between arrest and
arraignment provided the evidence is not obtained during a period of "un-
necessary delay." Thus geared to rule 5(a), the McNabb-Mallory doctrine
strikes a random balance between legitimate inquiry and constitutional pro-
tection. Were interrogation instead forbidden altogether except after arraign-
ment and then permitted under circumstances favorable to productive, non-
coercive inquiry, a more rational balance would be achieved. Accordingly, the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended to prohibit the
police from questioning an accused prior to his appearance before a commit-
ting officer. In addition, the Rules should empower the commissioner, on find-
196. See ABA STATEMENT 13-14.
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ing an arrest legal, first, to inform the arrested person of certain constitutional
and statutory rights and, second, to remit him to the police for a limited
period of questioning. The present arraignment procedure of rule 5(b) as
well as the rule 5(c) preliminary hearing should await the end of this
period.197
Immediate Arraignment
Rule 5(a) should be revised so that the police must cause an arrested per-
son to be arraigned as soon as he can be physically transported to a commit-
ting officer. Only a pressing need for medical attention should justify delay.
Prior to arraignment, the police should be allowed to ask the accused no more
than his name and address.198 Further questioning should be illegal, and no
statement gleaned during an illegal interrogation should be admissible as
evidence. The police would not be responsible for warning the accused of any
rights. Their single postarrest task would be to convey him immediately to a
commissioner.
To ensure compliance with these requirements, the commissioner should
ask an accused whether he made any statements to the police and, if so,
whether his statements were prompted by interrogation or other inducement.
A threshold confession or admission would therefore be quickly discovered,
and would be branded inadmissible if elicited by the police. In fact, any post-
arrest, prearraignment statement which the accused does not voluntarily re-
peat before the magistrate should be excluded from evidence, for substantial
doubt would exist as to how it was obtained. Manifestly, the prearraignment
time during which the police would have unsupervised control over the ac-
cused would be made as short as possible. And, since prearraignment confes-
sions obtained through interrogation would be inadmissible, the police would
have little incentive to hold an accused incommunicado for any period of time.
For the same reason, should a prompt appearance before a committing officer
be physically impossible, the ensuing period of detention would not invite
coercion. Thus, a grave defect in McNabb would be remedied: a safeguard
would exist against intensive interrogation in the event delay became "neces-
sary."
197. The present procedure is outlined in the text accompanying notes 1-7 stepra.
198. For a definition of arrest, see text at note 101 supra. Prior to arresting a per-
son, the police would be permitted to question him. But once they restrict the freedom
of the man they have accosted, they must be deemed to have made an arrest. This scheme
permits questions until the suspect desires to leave the scene. Once his departure is barred
or he is taken away to another place by the police, questioning must cease.
Under English practice, questioning is inhibited once arrest is made, but the time -,f
arrest depends on when the policeman decides to charge the accused. Royal Commission
on Police Powers and Procedure, Report, CMD. No. 3297, at 70 (1929) (judges' Rules);
Smith, Public Interest and the Interests of the Accuised in the Criminal Process-Re-
flections of a Scottish Lawyer, 32 TUL. L. Rav. 349, 352-53 (1958). Scottish practice is
more rigid. See id. at 360-61.
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The commissioner should also determine, on the face of police testimony
alone, whether or not the arrest was legal. If the accused was unlawfully
arrested, the commissioner must of course release him. This prompt judicial
determination of the lawfulness of arrest would preclude the detention and
interrogation of persons wrongfully apprehended. But if the commissioner
finds that the arrest was proper, he ordinarily should remit the accused to
police custody for a limited period of interrogation.199
Judicially Authorized Postarraignment Interrogation
The temporary return of the accused to police custody after arraignment
would provide an opportunity for interrogation of limited duration. Since the
period of interrogation would be judicially set beforehand, the probability of
coercion would be slight. The police should not be allowed to retain any ac-
cused longer than three hours; and the commissioner should restrict the in-
terval more severely if the accused appears to show unusual fear, anxiety or
emotional conflict. Three hours is, to be sure, an arbitrary figure. But it
seems a reasonable one representing a sufficiently brief span of time to fore-
stall psychological coercion through intensive questioning. Certainly, three
hours of questioning would not violate any precepts of fundamental fair-
ness 2 00-- especially in view of the fact that only the total exclusion of all state-
ments made in custody would guard against instantaneous, physical brutality.
Before remitting the accused, the commissioner should tell him that the
police may not in any way compel him to speak or to answer questions against
his will. The commissioner should be at great pains to make this caution clear.
He should also tell the accused that the period of interrogation is limited,
that the police must and will return him to the commissioner after a specified
length of time has elapsed, and that no subsequent period of police interroga-
tion will ensue. The accused should be encouraged to talk to the police if he
wants to be helpful or to confess or to try to clear himself; but the accused
should be urged not to answer questions-and told he need not do so-if he
would prefer to say nothing.20 1
199. In exceptional cases, the commissioner might determine that any police inter-
rogation at all would coerce the particular accused or induce him to make false state-
ments. No questioning should then be permitted.
201). Continuous interrogation held coercive by the Supreme Court has always been
carried on for a period far longer than three hours. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S.
191 (1957); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (.1954); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
(1949).
201. The commissioner's role in this regard is similar to that of an "ideal" lawyer.
"Officers may investigate, or even arrest, an innocent person or a guilty one whose
cnscience prompts him to disclose the truth. In such event, it is not so unusual as is
popularly supposed that a lawyer 'worth his salt' does advise his accused client to make
a full disclosure of all facts and thus assist in the solution of the crime under investiga-
tion." State v. Braasch, 229 P.2d 289, 295 (Utah 1951) (concurring opinion), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 910 (1952).
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The commissioner's warnings would make it.highly unlikely that an accused
would give untrustworthy confessions for fear that, unless he spoke, he would
be detained indefinitely or subjected to violence. Further warnings would be
unnecessary at this point and would unduly inhibit voluntary confession. No
need exists to advise the accused that anything he says may be used against
him.2 0 2 For an. individual vho wants to confess in order to appease a desire
for self-punishment, knowledge that his statements may be used against him
would merely encourage him to confess falsely. And counseling the accused
that he may not be compelled to speak should eliminate the danger of a con-
fession elicited through fear. Notifying the accused of his right to counsel
would also be premature. The magistrate's caution should suffice to prevent
falsification; and an attorney's assistance would not further ensure veracity.20 3
Postinterrogation Procedure
At the end of the prescribed interval, questioning would end; and the police
would promptly return the accused to the committing officer, who should then
ask him if he has made any statements to the police and, if so, under what
circumstances. If the accused alleges violence, his person should be immediate-
ly inspected. If the accused acknowledges making an oral confession which,
for want of time, was not transcribed, the commissioner should ask him
whether he is willing to have the confession taken down by a stenographer.
Should the accused agree, transcription should proceed forthwith, and the
accused permitted to sign the confession. These preliminaries (if any) dis-
pensed with, the commissioner should carry out the requirements of rules
5(b) and 5(c). He should advise the accused of his right to counsel and
warn him that his statements can be used against him. Further questioning
by the police would be prohibited unless the accused voluntarily agreed to
submit to it. If charged with a bailable offense, he should be admitted to bail.
And if he is committed, the marshal should take him to jail, not to police
headquarters.
Accessibility of Conlmitting Officers
To be effective, a procedure calling for the speedy judicial control of
arrested persons dictates that committing officers be readily accessible. Prompt
judicial supervision over the detention of persons arrested in the middle of
the night or on a holiday weekend is no less important than similar super-
vision when arrests occur during usual professional hours. In the District of
Columbia (where federal officers investigate and prosecute all the common-
law crimes), the availability of a committing officer twenty-four hours of
every day in the year is essential to the adequate protection of citizens'
rights.20 4 And in large metropolitan areas where arrests by federal agents are
202. See notes 216-18 infra and accompanying text (constitutional questions).
203. See notes 212-15 infra, and accompanying, text (constitutional questions).
204. See note 77 supra.
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frequent, a committing officer should likewise be on duty all the time. In every
federal judicial district, at least one United States commissioner should be
available at any hour. The cost of providing the extra commissioners is a
small price to pay for the efficient and equitable administration of criminal
justice.20 r
Constitutional Implications
The suggested changes in the procedure between arrest and the preliminary
hearing would be constitutionally permissible.
Right to Bail. A reasonable delay in admitting an accused to bail does not
transgress the eighth amendment's prohibition against excessive bail.20 6 By
implication, the amendment may accord a right to bail in certain instances,
20 7
but a brief delay would not compromise that right. That speed is of secondary
constitutional importance is shown by the fact that the power to fix bail in-
heres not in the police but in judicial officers.2 0 8 And at present, bail is post-
poned whenever a commissioner is unavailable. To contend that an accused,
once brought before a magistrate in a noncapital case, has a right to bail with-
out delay is to wander far from the language of the eighth amendment and
even from its implications. A brief delay in bail would neither impair a de-
fendant's preparation of his case nor, if administered uniformly, contradict
the presumption of his innocence.20 9
Right to Cdunsel. Under the suggested procedure, the accused would not
be told of his right to retain counsel until after being questioned by the police.
This delay would comport with the ruling that the right to counsel in federal
cases does not attach until the accused is asked to plead in court.210 And
205. For an exposition of the commissioner's functions and responsibilities, see U.S.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, CoMi. ON U.S. CO-cISSIONERS, MAANUAL FOR UNITED STATES
CO.IIONERS (rev. ed. 1948). For a discussion of his compensation, see generally
Hearings on H.R. 2460, H.R. 2461, H.R. 2462, H.R. 2464 Before a Subcommittee of the
House Comninittee on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15 (1946); Hearings on
H.R. 4127, H.R. 4128, H.R. 4129, H.R. 4130, H.R. 4131, H.R. 4132 Before a Subcom-
mintec of the House Counnittee on the Jvdiciary, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 19 (1944).
206. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
207. See United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1926); Comment, 51
ifIen. L. Rwv. 389, 394 (1953). Since the right to bail before federal conviction in a
noncapital case was granted by statute predating the Bill of Rights, the presence or
absence of a constitutional requirement has received little judicial discussion. See ibid.;
Comment, 20 U. Ci. L. REv. 330, 331 ('1953).
208. Sue 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1952) ; 28 U.S.C. § 637 (1952) ; FED. R. CRiM. P. 5(b).
209. On the purposes of bail, see Heikkinen v. United States, 208 F.2d 738, 742 (7th
Cir. 1953) ; United States ex reL Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, 155 F.Zd 1002, 1004 (2d Cir.
1946).
210. See note 2 supra; Michener v. Johnston, 141 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Evans
v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 641 (D.4C. Cir. 1942); Robinson v. Johnston, 50 F. Supp. 774
(N.D. Cal. 1943). Even when asked to plead, the accused may not have a right to coun-
sel. Hiatt v. Gann, 170 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1948); Wilfong v. Johnston, 156 F.2d 507
(9th Cir. 1946); ffeJordan v. Huff, 133 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1943)_
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"due process" guarantees require counsel only when the absence of a lawyer's
assistance would prevent an accused from receiving a fair trial.21' The Su-
preme Court has held that lack of counsel does not, without more, render a
confession constitutionally inadmissible.212 Surely, justice is not denied by a
brief period of police interrogation which, though the accused has no counsel,
is hedged about with safeguards designed to assure that the accused's state-
ments are reliable and voluntary. In this context, an attorney's efforts to im-
pose silence, if intended to prevent an accused from volunteering incriminat-
ing evidence, would frustrate, not facilitate, the course of justice.213
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. While involuntary statements may
be held inadmissible as violating the privilege against self-incrimination,
214
the police are not constitutionally obliged to notify an accused of the privilege
prior to interrogating him.2 1 5 Some courts have gone so far as to allow in
evidence admissions implied by the silence of the accused in the face of in-
criminating accusation.
216
To afford meaning to the privilege during police interrogation as well as to
prevent false statements induced by fear, the accused should be advised that
the police may not compel him to speak, and that he may refuse to answer any
211. Alexander v. United States, 136 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; 11cJordan v. Huff,
supra note 210; Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942); cf. Crooker
v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
212. E.g., Crooker v. California, supra note 211.
213. To bring in a lawyer means a real peril to solution of the crime, because, under
our adversary system, he deems that his sole duty is to protect his client-guilty
or innocent-and that in such a capacity he owes no duty whatever to help society
solve its crime problem. Under this conception of criminal procedure, any lawyer
worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to
police under any circumstances.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (concurring opinion per Jackson, J.). But see
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443-46 (1958) (dissenting opinion); Note, 44 Ky.
L.J. 103-04 (1955).
214. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) ; see Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 596-97 (1896) ; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1943) (dissenting
opinion). Since Brain, the Supreme Court has not utilized the self-incrimination clause
to exclude confessions and admissions obtained by the police. See note 15 supra. Brain's
rationale is of questionable persuasiveness. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 823, at 250 n.5
(3d ed. 1940).
215. Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1955); United States v. Heit-
ner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945); Morton v. United States, 147 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 875 (1945); cf. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896)
(commissioner's failure to warn not determinative of admissibility) ; Powers v. United
States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912) (same).
216. Rocchia v. United States, 78 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1935); Dickerson v. United
States, 65 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 665 (1933). Today, however,
the majority of federal courts have espoused the opposing viewpoint. Helton v. United
States, 221 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Lo Biondo, 135 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.
1943) ; Yep v. United States, 83 F.2d 41 (10th Cir. 1936) ; See Note, 40 MINN. L. REV.
598 (1956); Note, 5 STAN. L. REv. 459, 470 (1953).
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and all questions. No further caution seems necessary. Admittedly, a warning
that anything he says may be used against him would impress an arrested per-
son with the gravity of his situation.2 17 But this advice might also stifle a de-
sire to confess. 218 Furthermore, anyone who appreciated the seriousness of his
crime will appreciate the effects of its discovery. The guilty accused who fails
to recognize the extent of his misconduct does not merit after-the-event advice
apprising him of his error. And the wrongly accused, though ignorant of the
significance of police interrogation, should not be in danger of incriminating
himself, since truthful answers would serve to exonerate rather than impli-
cate him.
CONCLUSION
McNabb's inadequacy as a defendant's shield lies deeper than the present
uncertainty over what evidence must be excluded. The origin of the McNabb
doctrine and the method by which it operates are the source of its limitations.
Through evidentiary exclusion, the Supreme Court has sought to eliminate
frequently unprovable constitutional violations emanating from intensive in-
terrogation between arrest and arraignment. The doctrine assumes that sus-
tained interrogation too easily and too frequently leads to coercion; and that
coercion is more likely to occur before arraignment than after. It further as-
sumes that rule 5 (a), in requiring that prearraignment detention be no longer
than necessary. evidences a congressional design of protecting arrested per-
sons against the probability of coercion during that interval. Accepting these
assumptions, the Court has rendered violations of the rule unprofitable-even
prejudicial-to criminal investigators. The McNabb-Mallory doctrine has
thus developed not as an independent judicial weapon for protecting defend-
ants against the danger of prearraignment coercion, but as a judicial method
of enforcing a congressional attempt to provide such protection. Hence, the
Court's rule of exclusion is only activated when rule 5(a) is violated. Mc-
Nabb's shortcomings as a shield against coercion are therefore a function of
rule 5(a)'s deficiencies.
If the oft-repeated purpose of McNabb 210 were effectuated, the Supreme
Court would forbid any interval long enough to allow the police to undertake
217. See Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, Report, C.VD. No.
3297, at 28 (1929). This report notes that the "constable's caution" was originally given
by a magistrate to whom the constable brought the accused immediatelyr upon arrest. Id.
at 142. The purpose of the caution was to insure -the voluntariness of the accused's state-
ment by showing the court that he knew that he was under no obligation to speak or
incriminate himself. Ibid. Indeed, the Commission's suggested caution omits reference to
the fact that anything said by the accused could subsequently be used against him.
Rather, he is to be told to be careful what he says. Id. at 29.
218. See Letter from English Policeman on Use of Judges' Rules, in SELEcrE
VRITINGS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AND TRL.AL 845 (Fryer ed. 1957) (ignorance of
law leads to incriminating statements). But see SARGENT, BATTLE FOR TIRE MIND 191
(1957).
219. See note 15 suPra.
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intensive interrogation. A shorter period would not create the same proba-
bility of coercion nor require the added deterrent of evidentiary exclusion.
But federal prompt arraignment legislation is not devoted exclusively to the
elimination of coercion. Rule 5(a)'s command permits a reasonable delay
occasioned by the unavailability of a magistrate or by other circumstances
which render the prompt production of the accused impracticable. 22 0 Conse-
quently, a lawful delay could afford ample opportunity for intensive inter-
rogation leading to constitutional delicts. Operating as it does upon the vio-
lation of a statute which condones delay for reasons of practicality, McNabb's
protection against coercion is necessarily incomplete.
If the policy behind McNabb were divorced from rule 5(a), that policy
would exclude evidence in all cases in which an opportunity for prearraign-
ment coercion existed. The resulting interference with police interrogations
would pose a serious threat to effective law enforcement. The solution to this
problem is not, however, to overrule McNabb-Mallory by legislation and
thereby open the door to illegal arrests and coercive prearraignment detention.
Protection must be maintained against the abuses which may frequently occur
while an arrested person is exclusively under the control of the police. Ac-
cordingly, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended to
proscribe prearraignment interrogation altogether and to provide instead for
postarraignment questioning subject to judicial supervision minimizing the
probability of coercion. Since interrogation would then occur only after the
legality of an arrest had been judicially determined, the unjustified harass-
ment of innocent persons would be inhibited.
The suggested procedure may well prove less than ideal for the police.
Nevertheless, the traditions of our free society dictate that efficiency in law
enforcement be sacrificed whenever a danger exists of undue imposition on
the innocent and of unprovable constitutional violations against innocent and
guilty alike.221 vlore positively, the recommended procedure will enhance both
the clarity of the prompt-arraignment requirement and the protection afforded
arrested persons against improper police activities. The opportunity for inter-
rogation, lost in the prearraignment period, is restored at a juncture when
coercive activity is less likely to occur. Hopefully, this comprehensive over-
haul of present legislation and case law would strike a proper balance be-
tween the need for effective law enforcement and the right of the people to
be secure from the lawlessness of an overzealous or undisciplined police.,
220. See text at notes 77, 79, 84 ,iqia,
2 E1..g., ABA STATEMENT 8.
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